Ukrainian refugees in the EU – between war and integration

This framing of Ukrainian refugees as those who ‘failed to meet expectations’ is quite common in the German media. This article aims to move away from the focus on personalised successes and failures and draw attention to the structural pressures that affect refugees from several directions at once.

Recent data and the biggest problems of refugees

This article uses the term “refugee”, but from a legal point of view, most Ukrainians in Europe enjoy a special legal status that differs from refugee status in the classical sense. For example, Ukrainians have direct access to the labour market and social benefits, unlike other groups.

Ukrainian refugees face several challenges at once: anti-migrant sentiment in host countries, difficulties with integration, and uncertainty caused by the war. Using Germany as an example, we will look at the specific difficulties refugees face and why Ukraine needs to change its diaspora policy, given that important professionals, such as doctors, will be lost. In this article, we will focus on Ukrainian refugees, but from a legal point of view, most Ukrainians in European countries enjoy a special legal status that differs from refugee status in the classical sense. For example, Ukrainians have direct access to the labour market and social benefits, unlike other groups.

As of May 2024, there were 4.2 million refugees from Ukraine in the EU. Of these, 1.3 million are in Germany, 953,000 in Poland, and 356,000 in the Czech Republic. Other countries received 100,000 refugees or fewer. Analysing studies and reports from different EU countries, we can identify the main areas of importance for adaptation:

– Learning the language – it takes a long time, so many countries have integration courses where they teach the language. Language level is one of the main obstacles in finding a job. For example, for nurses who want to work in Germany, they need a B1 or B2 level, which corresponds to an average of 450 hours of studying.
– Housing - in Germany, Ukrainian refugees are entitled to rent reimbursement, but they have to find a place to stay themselves. Research shows that success in finding accommodation depends on social connections - those who had friends in Germany at the time of arrival were able to find accommodation faster.
– Healthcare - Ukrainian refugees, like almost everyone else living in Germany, have access to public health insurance, which covers most of the necessary services. Difficulties arise with access to specialist doctors, who are in short supply in the system as a whole. A further problem for refugees is the language barrier - many need to find interpreters to help them when they go to the doctor.

In the EU, there are programmes to help Ukrainian refugees in all three aspects - language courses, rental compensation and access to healthcare on a par with citizens have been introduced. All these factors together affect the speed of integration and employment. However, they are compounded by other obstacles, such as many issues related to children (finding schools, learning the language, problems of adaptation and bullying, etc.). In addition, there are factors of trauma and psychological discomfort – most refugees came from the eastern and southern regions, many witnessed the fighting and were victims of Russian attacks themselves, and have experience of losing their homes and/or loved ones. In addition, the experience of unplanned relocation is difficult for most refugees.

Integration into the labour market - how Ukrainians should close the gaps

The intermediate results of the labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees vary. One relatively positive example is the Czech Republic. According to data from 2023, 60% of refugees of working age are employed, only 14% of them on a temporary or non-permanent basis. However, half of all Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic work in low-skilled jobs, and two-thirds work in jobs below their qualifications. In addition, two thirds of all Ukrainian refugees live below the poverty line. The elderly and families with children are at risk.

However, the share of households receiving humanitarian aid has slightly decreased compared to last year, while the share of those with their own income has increased. The proportion of people suffering from material deprivation in March 2023 was 78%, which is 5% less than in December 2022 (among Czech citizens, this figure was 5% in December 2022).

In Germany, the process of integration into the labour market is more complicated. According to the German Federal Employment Agency, as of September 2024, 266,000 out of 887,000 Ukrainians of working age were employed. Of these, 213,000 had taxable jobs, and 53,000 had ‘mini jobs’ that are not taxed. 212,000 were registered as unemployed. About a quarter of the latter had a university degree. Most refugees started working in ‘various economic services’ (including temporary work, gardening and facility management, manufacturing, construction, and hospitality).

As of June 2024, 717,000 Ukrainian citizens were receiving assistance under the basic income support programme. The majority of refugees in Germany are women with children, and Ukrainians in Germany are younger and more likely to have higher education than other migrant groups.

In other words, the Czech and German situations illustrate two strategies, where in the first case faster integration into the labour market and economic independence are achieved at the cost of greater poverty compared to citizens, and in the second case, higher labour standards and system complexity lead to longer dependence on social assistance (which is not guaranteed in the long term due to the legal status of Ukrainian refugees, unlike German citizens). However, the German strategy can lead to good long-term integration and motivate refugees to stay, given how difficult the adaptation process is.

It is also important to understand that Germany consciously seeks to ‘close social gaps’ with migrants, and Ukrainian refugees in particular. Why the German bureaucracy, which refugees have little influence over, is a major factor that slows down employment can be seen in the case of Ukrainian doctors, nurses and caregivers. They are highly desirable among employers because of the massive shortage of staff.

The labour migration of Ukrainian women to work in care and medicine is not a new trend, and given the large number of people who arrived after 2022, there is a certain expectation in Germany that refugees will quickly integrate into areas where there is a shortage of staff. As early as March 2022, German media and specialised medical and care publications published articles about employment of Ukrainian refugees in the care sector.

One such text from January 2023 begins with a frustrated description of the employment situation:

‘The hope that nursing staff who left Ukraine would be able to reduce the shortage of staff in the sector has not been realised.’ Describing the long and difficult process of diploma recognition as one of the main obstacles. This process is complicated by the need to convert education and work experience gained in Ukraine into German standards, which is handled by specialised state institutions. But because the care and healthcare sector has a large shortage of staff, as mentioned above, Ukrainian women workers are particularly in demand.

As a result, employers are relaxing their requirements and actively helping out: for example, particularly difficult jobs, such as caring for non-mobile children in hospitals, are available even for those with a poor command of German. In addition, many employees are assisted with the formal aspects of the process (translation and certification of documents, etc.), offered their own specialised German courses and prepared for professional exams that are part of the diploma recognition. However, many nurses and caregivers face a very long wait - the whole process involves a lot of formalities, clarifications and, accordingly, appeals to specific authorities, which can take months to be answered.

This situation is commented on by Maria Brusova, a nurse from Luhansk who has experience as both an internally displaced and a refugee, has already had her diploma recognised, works in Germany in her field of study and actively helps other nurses overcome bureaucratic obstacles. In her opinion, the recognition process itself is easier than, for example, for doctors (although many nurses perceive it as the biggest obstacle), and the main problems are the language barrier and children:

‘Bureaucracy and language barrier. And often, it's a general problem, because 70% of Ukrainian refugees are women and they have nowhere to put their children. And this hinders both language integration and employment.’

Maria has created an online community of Ukrainian nurses in Germany and sometimes conducts surveys among her readers. One such survey on intentions to return or stay showed that about 68% plan to stay and another 3% want to move to another country (not Ukraine). Those who do not want to stay plan to return only after the end of hostilities (14%). Regarding those who do not want to stay, Maria gives the example of one of the few nurses she knows:

‘I know only one woman here who constantly says she doesn't want to do anything here, she wants to go home because the prospects are unclear, and the salary is so-so. Because in Ukraine, she had a higher standard of living than nursing work can offer here. She was a business owner, as I understand, she had a nail salon or something related to medicine. And here she is constantly writing that ‘I don't know if I should go through diploma acknowledgment, because it's tedious, and there is no payoff.

At the same time, she notes that most of them plan to stay in Germany for life or return only for retirement. In her opinion, the working conditions in Ukraine are the biggest reason why nurses are reluctant to return:

‘If we're talking about nurses, (it has to do) with the conditions in Ukraine for medical staff. To earn a decent living in Ukraine, you have to work two jobs, and work hard, or have a “normal” job in a hospital department, and a second job somewhere else - to do IVs, to look after someone from a rich family, or some grandma...’

The need for healthcare workers to have a second job to support themselves has been known for a long time, as well as the lack of communication channels with the authorities, the feeling of devaluation of their work and excessive workloads. However, the situation with labour rights and remuneration is not getting better. The experiences of medical professionals are very important, as the difficulty of integration and employment will be converted into so-called ‘sunk costs’ for those who have successfully integrated abroad when the question of returning to Ukraine arises. At the same time, Ukraine is forecasting a shortage of doctors in general, while the need for certain specialists (rehabilitation specialists, psychologists etc.) is already urgent due to the war. So far, Ukraine has not responded to these challenges.

Ukrainian refugees in German and Ukrainian politics

Ukrainian politics and the diaspora

Even after 2022 and the outbreak of a full-scale war, when the Ukrainian diaspora became many times larger due to refugees, the Ukrainian authorities seem to be disinterested in developing a consistent policy of interaction with Ukrainian citizens abroad. Today, the only noticeable trends in foreign policy are the slow development of diplomatic and cultural ties with previously ignored countries (such as the opening of new embassies and the development of the Ukrainian Institute) and the creation of mechanisms for the return of men liable for military service to Ukraine. However, those who integrate and plan to stay in other countries are not the focus of the political strategy. So far, interaction has been limited to isolated episodes of populist accusations against refugees, such as statement of the advisor to the Head of the Presidential Office Serhiy Leshchenko that aid to Ukrainian refugees should be stopped to force them to return, or President Zelensky's statement during last year's New Year's address about the choice to ‘be a citizen or a refugee’. Ukraine itself has never had a fair refugee policy, and this lack of strategy is reflected in the treatment of its own citizens abroad.

Meanwhile, according to the Institute for Economic Studies, compared to 2022, the proportion of Ukrainians who want to settle outside Ukraine has increased from 10% in 2022 to 26% in 2024. The number of those who want to stay in Germany also increases the longer the war lasts - as of January 2024, 77% plan to stay and only 20% want to return. The uncertainty of the war and the increasing integration into new societies can make it much more difficult for people to return, especially if there is no positive strategy instead of coercion.

Furthermore, long-term integration will not only be about finding employment and leaving social benefits, but also about obtaining permanent residence permits or citizenship, and with it political rights. For example, Germany has recently enacted a law that simplifies the procedure for obtaining citizenship, among other things, by requiring five years of residence instead of eight and allowing everyone to keep their first passport. All this will make the prospect of returning very unlikely for those who integrate. Ukraine only plans to allow double citizenships as of now.

German anti-migrant sentiment and the Ukrainian diaspora

At the same time, recent developments in European politics and the US elections show a trend towards the success of right-wing populist parties, which, if they continue coming to power, could make life much more difficult for refugees. So far, they may be restrained by the opposition of democratic forces of various orientations, as happened, for example, in France. However, in Germany, early parliamentary elections are due to take place soon, in which the right-wing radical, pro-Russian and aggressively hostile to migrants and refugees party Alternative for Germany (AFD) may make significant gains. Members of this party openly declare that Ukraine does not belong to the EU or even to Europe, relativise Germany's role in World War II, and promise mass deportations to their voters.

The right-wing radical AFD and the social chauvinist Sarah Wagenknecht Union (BSW) are becoming increasingly successful - the European Parliamentary elections and local elections in the Eastern German regions show that their success is not a one-off episode. The reasons for this success are debated, and many explanations are given. The AFD's rhetoric has become openly chauvinistic and partly promotes real segregation of migrants - recently, the head of the AFD faction in one of the city parliaments proposed a ban on different groups of refugees attending public events in Germany. Ukrainian refugees were a separate category in this list.

For refugees and migrants, the attempts of almost all other parties to adopt the anti-migrant and populist agenda of the AFD and the BSW are a bad sign. For example, the chancellor candidate of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, which also took a good position in the last election and is currently leading in national polls, in 2023 publicly stated how refugees deprive German citizens of the opportunity to be treated by dentists (which is not true and was criticised by medical publications). Recently, he has again said that Germany, ‘overcrowded’ with migrants, suffers from a lack of resources in numerous areas - healthcare, housing market, and higher education. It is unclear why he believes that migrants, who are always in a worse legal and almost always in a worse socio-economic position than citizens, are to blame for these problems.

As for Ukrainian refugees, Merz called them ‘social tourists’ back in 2022, for which he was later forced to apologise after criticism from other politicians, including Interior Minister Faeser. Representatives of the Christian Social Union's sister party suggested simply deporting those who had not found a job in two years:

‘More than two years after the outbreak of the war, the principle should be applied: find a job in Germany or return to the safe areas of Western Ukraine.’

Without mentioning, of course, that there are no completely safe places in Ukraine, as the tragedy in Lviv where a mother and three of her daughters were killed by a russian missile has shown. He also doesn't mention that the major cities of these regions are already overcrowded with IDPs who have their own numerous difficulties, such as major problems with finding housing and homelessness.

On the other hand, since 2022, the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany has grown significantly, with 1.3 million Ukrainian citizens living there as of May 2024, compared to 151,000 in February 2022. This means that the Ukrainian diaspora is the second largest in Germany after the Turkish diaspora and accounts for almost 9% of all foreign nationals in the country. However, although there are ‘only’ a little over 308,000 Russian citizens in the country, there are many so-called Russian Germans who hold German or two passports and therefore have political rights that Ukrainians do not, and therefore have a greater influence on the political situation. In addition, ‘Russian Germans’ are more likely than others to vote for the AFD, as the examples of cities where they make up a large proportion of the population show.

Given that more and more Ukrainians are planning to stay in Germany over time, the situation should even out somewhat in the future. Already, the Ukrainian diaspora is becoming more institutionalised and more engaged in political activities and promoting its own interests. For example, in Berlin, the Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations was created to unite existing Ukrainian NGOs in Germany and actively help create new ones.

Oleksandra Bienert, Chair of the Board of the Alliance, spoke about its activities, most of which are carried out in Berlin. She said that until February 2022, 24,000 people of Ukrainian descent lived in Berlin, of whom only 13,000 had a Ukrainian passport. Currently, about 80,000 people with Ukrainian roots live in the capital. The significant growth of the diaspora is evident not only in the increasing number of Ukrainian organisations, but also in their greater diversity. Alongside the ‘classic’ cultural organisations, organisations have been established that deal with vulnerable groups, such as queer and HIV-positive people, and an organisation for people with disabilities will be established in the near future.

In Oleksandra's opinion, the ‘right turn’ is a very negative phenomenon, and she sees the way out in solidarity:

‘If someone thinks that it won't affect us because we are white migrants, they are wrong, unfortunately... it will affect everyone, and that's why we need to fight even harder for the rights of those who are currently oppressed or discriminated against the most - namely, to fight racism against people of colour, to fight racism against Muslims, to fight anti-Semitism and racism against Sinti and Roma.’

Already, intercultural events involving the Ukrainian diaspora are being organised under the leadership of the organisations with Oleksandra's participation, such as meetings of Afghan and Ukrainian women, and the participation of the Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations in the organising committee of the Berlin General Meeting of Migrant Organisations - an event where different diasporas can directly discuss common challenges and solutions. This event will be held in November for the sixth time, but it will be the first time that Ukrainians will participate.

Regarding the policy of the Ukrainian state, Oleksandra noted the growing interest in the issue of return. ‘The Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations has a good partnership with the Ukrainian Embassy in Berlin, but now the interest is growing among politicians within Ukraine. But so far, this interest is narrowly focused and poorly informed about the needs of the people:

‘I would like the Ukrainian state to perceive Ukrainians more as subjects, not as some kind of mass that needs to be returned home. Everyone has their own personal stories, I myself tried to return, and I know how difficult it was. I understand that Ukraine needs to be rebuilt, I understand that we need working hands and people, and I am happy to help us understand what people's needs are here so that they can return to Ukraine.’

As can be seen for Ukrainian refugees, despite unprecedentedly positive legal conditions, the situation is not easy - integration and language learning is a long and difficult process in new countries, and Ukraine does not yet have a coherent diaspora policy and good ideas for returning people. Those who have qualifications that are desirable in European labour markets, such as doctors, integrate the fastest. But the problem is that these personnel will be urgently needed in Ukraine as well - the shortage of doctors has been predicted for a long time. Ukraine needs to revise its policy towards the diaspora. It needs to move away from populist statements and strategies to ensuring socio-economic changes in Ukraine that would motivate returning Ukrainians, such as doctors, and, on the other hand, cooperate with proactive diaspora organisations that do not yet feel sufficient state support in the face of an increasingly noticeable ‘right turn’.