The Illusion of Agency: A Chronicle of the Quiet Anschluss of Belarus

These maneuvers force a blunt question about Minsk's real status: does Belarus remain a free actor, or have its borders, sky, and economy already definitively turned into an instrument in Moscow's hands, despite the Belarusian dictator's diplomatic overtures toward Washington? And what position should Ukraine take?

Anatomy of the "Union State"

For a long time, the "Union State" project, launched back in the late 90s, was perceived by political scientists as a stillborn geopolitical chimera or a way for Lukashenko to bargain for money from the Kremlin. However, events following the 2020 protests changed everything. What was previously the subject of endless discussions transformed into a rigid algorithm of absorption through the implementation of the "28 Union Programs." This package of documents, approved on November 4, 2021, by Decree No. 6 of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, turned vague political promises into a clear legal trap: Belarusian legislation is simply being rewritten to match Russia's.

Belarus’s economic sovereignty was dismantled through the tax sector. Under the Treaty on General Principles of Taxation, Minsk lost the right to independently determine fiscal policy. The creation of a supranational Tax Committee and the integration of administration systems mean that Russian fiscal authorities have gained full access to information about Belarusian taxpayers in real time.

The situation in the humanitarian sphere looks like a "cognitive occupation," but it operates through hybrid methods. The joint Media Holding, created in 2024, has to solve a complex task: to synchronize the consciousness of Belarusians with that of Russians without destroying Lukashenko's main myth of an "island of stability." While Minsk's state media consciously dose the topic of the war so as not to scare society, whose social contract relies on the fear of chaos, Union media structures work at a deep level. Their goal is not mobilization for the front, but the unification of the image of the enemy and the cultural code. Together with the work of the Joint Commission on History, this forms a space where a Belarusian begins to look at the world through the eyes of a Russian, even without leaving their comfort zone.

Chains of Dependency: Military and Economic Control

If legal integration creates frameworks, then the military presence of the Russian Federation turns them into steel bars. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus became a point of no return for the state's security sovereignty. Despite Lukashenko's loud statements about "control over the button," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus stated that real control over the nuclear arsenal remains exclusively with Moscow. This has turned the country not into a player, but into a hostage whose territory is a legitimate target for a retaliatory strike. The picture is completed by the Unified Regional Air Defense System, which has essentially subordinated the Belarusian sky to Russian command.

The economic trap looks no less hopeless due to infrastructural isolation. After access to Baltic ports was closed (until mid-2021, most trade passed through the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda) due to sanctions, Belarusian exports (potash, oil products) fell into total dependence on Russian logistics. The signed intergovernmental agreement on the transshipment of cargo through Russian ports (St. Petersburg, Murmansk) deprived Minsk of the opportunity to conduct multi-vector trade. Now, any attempt at political independence can be instantly punished by Moscow by simply blocking railway routes to the ports, which would mean immediate collapse for the Belarusian economy.

The US Factor: Geopolitical Game or Imitation of Freedom?

The events of December 2025 demonstrated Alexander Lukashenko's signature survival style. The visit of Donald Trump's special envoy, John Coale, and the release of 123 political prisoners were the result of a tactic that Lukashenko has honed for years on Putin: find the partner's "ego" and play on it. By offering Minsk as a refuge for Venezuelan dictator Maduro and praising Trump's "peacemaking genius," the Belarusian regime is trying to sell Washington not democracy, but crisis management services.

In response, the US lifted sanctions on Belaruskali, but the main trap lies here. Financial authorization for trade does not solve the problem of physical logistics. Lithuania, whose relations with Minsk have been ruined by "migration attacks" from Belarus, keeps the port of Klaipeda closed. Transit through Russia is too expensive for fertilizer profitability. In this context, the scenario of transit through the Ukrainian port of Odesa is being discussed (as part of Trump's future major ceasefire deal).

Paradoxically, even this success underscores Minsk's dependency. By deporting prisoners not to Vilnius but to Ukraine, Lukashenko is attempting to insert himself into the Russian-Ukrainian negotiation track, demonstrating loyalty to Trump. But without the Kremlin's permission for such maneuvers and without an end to the war, Belarusian potash remains in warehouses, and the "diplomatic breakthrough" is merely a loud headline on the US President's social media.

Lukashenko is not changing course and is not becoming a democrat – he is simply adapting his favorite tactic to new realities. His entire political life has been built on the ability to find an approach to a stronger partner through flattery and demonstrative loyalty. For years, he used this scheme with Putin: swearing eternal brotherhood, calling Russia the "older brother," and receiving cheap gas in return. Now, feeling the Kremlin's stranglehold, he is trying to apply the same technique to Donald Trump. Praising the "genius" of the American president, offers to host Maduro, and assistance with PR are all an attempt to become the "favorite vassal" for Washington this time.

However, playing the "servant" has its limits. The institutional Anschluss that Russia has conducted through the mechanisms of the Union State makes all of Lukashenko's attempts futile; he can flatter Trump, release political prisoners, and try to engage in dialogue with the EU, but the keys to his country are no longer in his pocket. In this situation, strengthening official ties between Ukraine and the Belarusian opposition is a necessary and timely policy.